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THE RECEPTION OF HANS KELSEN’S LEGAL THEORY IN THE 
UNITED STATES:  A SOCIOLOGICAL MODEL 
D. A. Jeremy Telman∗ 
Abstract 
The Essay explores the reasons underlying opposition to Hans 
Kelsen's approach to the law within the U.S. legal academy. The 
vehemence with which legal scholars within the United States rejected 
Kelsen's philosophy of law is best understood as a product of numerous 
factors, some philosophical, some political and some having to do with 
professional developments within the legal academy itself. Because 
philosophical and political opposition to Kelsen's legal philosophy has 
been well-explored in earlier articles, this Essay discusses those topics 
briefly in Part I and then sets out in Part II a sociological model that 
grounds the academy's rejection of Kelsen's pure theory of law in 
professionalization processes already well underway when Kelsen 
arrived in the United States. 
Kelsen had little impact in the U.S. legal academy not only because 
his brand of legal positivism was uncongenial to a U.S. audience. He 
also had little impact because he arrived in the United States just as the 
twin innovations of Legal Realism and the professionalization of the 
legal academy were solidifying their grips on the U.S. legal community. 
His mode of legal thought and his approach to legal education could not 
be accommodated within the newly-created discursive practice of the 
legal professoriate, and there was thus little possibility that his approach 
could be accommodated within that realm. 
INTRODUCTION 
At the time of the Nazi seizure of power, Hans Kelsen was 
Germany’s leading legal theorist and the Dean of the Faculty of 
Law at the University of Cologne.1  Forced from his university 
post because of his Jewish ancestry, Kelsen fled to Geneva in 1933 
                                                 
∗
 Associate Professor, Valparaiso University School of Law.  The 
author thanks his colleagues for their support and for their comments on 
a draft of this Essay that was presented at a faculty colloquium.   
1
 RUDOLF ALADÁR MÉTALL, HANS KELSEN: LEBEN UND WERK 
(Vienna: Verlag Franz Deuticke, 1969), at 57-63.   
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and to the United States in 1940.2  By that time, Kelsen’s 
reputation was already well-established in the United States.  In 
1934, Roscoe Pound, a legal theorist and Dean of the Harvard Law 
School, lauded Kelsen as “undoubtedly the leading jurist of the 
time.”3   
After his immigration to the United States, Kelsen spent 30 
years actively engaged in scholarship and teaching in the United 
States and at visiting professorships abroad,4 but his approach to 
legal theory never found a following within the legal academy of 
the United States, even as his reputation grew internationally.  Karl 
Llewellyn, a leading practitioner of the Realist school of 
jurisprudence, regarded Kelsen’s work as “utterly sterile,” 
although he acknowledged Kelsen’s intellect.5  Echoing Oliver 
Wendell Holmes’ famous dictum that the life of the law is not 
logic but experience, Harold Laski denounced Kelsen’s legal 
theory as a sterile “exercise in logic and not in life.”6  To this day, 
Kelsen and his ideas are rarely considered in the U.S. legal 
academy. 7  Recently, one of the United States’ leading 
                                                 
2
 Id. at 63-64, 76-77.   
3
 Roscoe Pound, Law and the Science of Law in Recent Theories, in 43 
YALE L.J. 525, 532 (1934).   
4
 During the time that he was living in the United States, Kelsen taught 
and/or held visiting professorships in Geneva, Newport, The Hague, 
Vienna, Copenhagen, Stockholm, Helsingfors, Edinburgh and Chicago.  
He received honorary doctorates from Utrecht, Harvard, Chicago, 
Mexico, Berkeley, Salamanca, Berlin, Vienna, New York, Paris, and 
Salzburg.  Nicoletta Bersier Ladavac, Bibliographical Note and 
Biography, 9 EUROPEAN J. INT’L L. 391, 392 (1998). 
5
 See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE:  REALISM IN THEORY 
AND PRACTICE (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), at 356, n.6 
(“I see Kelsen’s work as utterly sterile, save in by-products that derive 
from his taking his shrewd eyes, for a moment, off what he thinks of as 
‘pure law.’”).   
6
 HAROLD LASKI, A GRAMMAR OF POLITICS (4th ed.) (London: Allen 
& Unwin, 1938), at vi. 
7
 Albert Calsamiglia, For Kelsen, 13 RATIO JURIS 196, 99 (2000) (“At 
present, in North America, Kelsen is practically unknown, and with only 
a few exceptions . . . American [j]urisprudence has totally ignored his 
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 philosophers of law contended that Kelsen has no following in the 
United States, at least among philosophers of law, because H.L.A. 
Hart demonstrated “that two central features of his jurisprudential 
view seem to be mistaken.”8 
Two simple quotations exemplify the extent to which Kelsen’s 
entire approach to law is anathema to U.S. legal scholars.  In the 
two areas where one might expect Kelsen’s influence to be 
unavoidable—international law and jurisprudence—opposition to 
his thought is most pronounced.  As is well-known, Kelsen sought 
to create a science of law as an autonomous field, divorced from 
politics and morality.9  But when students in the United States are 
introduced to international law through one of the most popular 
U.S. casebooks, the very first sentence they confront in Chapter 1, 
Section 1 reads as follows: “First, law is politics.”10   
                                                                                                       
contribution.”).  The United States’ most widely cited legal theorist, 
Judge Richard Posner, admitted that, until recently, he had never read 
Kelsen.  RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003), at 250.   
8
 Brian Leiter, Why don’t American philosophers of law talk about 
Kelsen? Brian Leiter’s Legal Philosophy Blog (Oct. 3, 2007), 
http://leiterlegalphilosophy.typepad.com/leiter/2007/10/why-dont-amer-
1.html.  
9
 See Hans Kelsen, “‘Foreword’ to the Second Printing of Main 
Problems in the Theory of Public Law,” in NORMATIVITY AND NORMS: 
ESSAYS ON KELSEN (Stanley L. Paulson (ed.)) (Oxford, Eng.: Clarendon 
Press, 1998), at 1, 1-2 (“The purity of the theory is to be secured against 
he claims of a so-called ‘sociological’ point of view, which employs 
causal, scientific methods to appropriate the law as a part of natural 
reality.  And it is to be secured against the natural law theory, which, by 
ignoring the fundamental referent found exclusively in the positive law, 
takes legal theory out of the realm of positive legal norms and into that 
ethico-political postulates.”)  
10
 LORI DAMROSCH, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS (4th ed.) (St. Paul, MN:  West, 2001), at 1. The sentence at 
issue is presented in an excerpt from an essay by one of the casebook’s 
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Leading U.S. legal philosophers similarly rejected Kelsen’s 
fundamental principles.  In 1949, for example, after Kelsen had 
been teaching in the United States for nearly a decade, Lon Fuller, 
the celebrated U.S. legal scholar and theorist, noted that Kelsen 
had “excluded justice from his studies because it is an ‘irrational 
ideal’ and therefore ‘not subject to cognition.’”  Fuller noted that 
“the whole structure of [Kelsen’s] theory derives from this 
exclusion.”11  But Fuller voiced his agreement with Jerome Hall, 
who in his influential Readings in Jurisprudence stated that 
jurisprudence must start with justice.12  Leading U.S. academics’ 
approach to the law derives from principles antithetical to Kelsen’s 
pure theory of law. 
In this Essay, I shall explore the reasons underlying opposition 
to Kelsen’s approach within the U.S. legal academy.  The 
vehemence with which legal scholars within the United States 
rejected Kelsen’s philosophy of law is best understood as a product 
of numerous factors, some philosophical, some political and some 
having to do with professional developments within the legal 
academy itself.  Because I believe that philosophical and political 
opposition to Kelsen’s legal philosophy has been well-explored in 
earlier articles, I will discuss those topics briefly in Part I and then 
set out in Part II a sociological model that grounds the academy’s 
rejection of Kelsen’s pure theory of law in professionalization 
processes already well underway when Kelsen arrived in the 
United States. 
My aim in this Essay is neither to portray Kelsen as a victim 
nor as an overlooked genius who offered elixirs that could have 
been used to treat the various ailments afflicting the U.S. legal 
academy.  Although shunned by the U.S. legal academy, Kelsen 
                                                                                                       
authors, Louis Henkin, who has been a leading figure in his field within 
the U.S. academy for decades. 
11
 Lon L. Fuller, The Place and Uses of Jurisprudence in the Law 
School Curriculum, 1 J. LEGAL EDUC. 495, 496 (1949).  It is also 
significant that Fuller’s essay appears in the first volume of a new journal 
that has since become the dominant U.S. journal on legal pedagogy. 
12
 Id. (citing JEROME HALL, READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE (1938)). 
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 enjoyed a brilliant career and cannot be portrayed as a person to be 
pitied.  I am moreover, at this point in my immersion in Kelsen’s 
legal theory, agnostic as to whether, or to what extent, the U.S. 
legal academy would benefit from a belated encounter with 
Kelsen.  Rather, the Essay is an exercise in the sociology of 
knowledge and a contribution to the intellectual history of the U.S. 
legal academy.  The fact that Kelsen plays almost no role in that 
history says relatively little about Kelsen and is intended to 
illustrate the structures of openness and exclusions within which a 
professional modality develops.  Historians of the legal profession 
in the United States have tackled the more obvious and sinister 
exclusions (based on race, gender and class) attendant to the 
professionalization process.13  The story behind the exclusion of 
alternative models of legal theory has yet to be told.14 
I.  KELSEN AND THE POLITICS AND JURISPRUDENCE OF LEGAL 
REALISM 
Immediately upon arriving in the United States, Kelsen was 
accorded the dignities to which his reputation entitled him.  
Kelsen’s General Theory of Law and State15 was selected as the 
first volume of the American Academy of Legal Scholars’ 
                                                 
13
 See ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL:  LEGAL EDUCATION IN 
AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980S (Chapel Hill, NC:  University 
of North Carolina Press, 1983); JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL 
JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1976). 
14
 In a delightfully iconoclastic essay, John Henry Schlegel provides 
examples of ways in which powerful figures within the U.S. legal 
academy effectively opposed proposed pedagogical innovations, but he 
does not address theoretical exclusions.  John Henry Schlegel, Between 
the Harvard Founders and the American Legal Realists: The 
Professionalization of the American Law Professor, 35 J. LEG. EDUC. 
311, 323 (1985). 
15
 KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1945). 
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Twentieth Century Legal Philosophy Series.16  He was also invited 
to give the inaugural Oliver Wendell Holmes lectures at Harvard 
Law School, and those lectures were collected in a Harvard 
publication, Law and Peace in International Relations.17  And yet, 
although his publications could not have appeared in more 
prominent venues, they garnered little attention in law journals.18  
As Stanley Paulson noted in his fine essay on the Kelsen reception 
in the United States, the few detailed discussions of Kelsen’s work 
to appear in U.S. law reviews were written by fellow émigrés who 
had undertaken a thorough study of the pure theory of law in 
Europe before coming to America.19  Most significantly, Kelsen, 
one of Europe’s foremost legal scholars, was unable to obtain a 
full-time teaching position at any U.S. law school.  Instead, he 
joined the faculty of the political science department of the 
University of California, Berkeley.20 
A. Realist Opposition to Kelsen’s Philosophy of Law 
U.S. jurisprudence in the twentieth century and to this day has 
prided itself on its hard-headed realism, or pragmatism.  Not only 
is it considered a cliché to say that “we are all Realists now;” 
apparently, it is now recognized as cliché to point out the cliché.21  
                                                 
16
 R. K. Gooch, Review of KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND 
THE STATE, 32 VA. L. REV. 212, 213 (1945). 
17
 KELSEN, LAW AND PEACE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1942).  
18
 See R. S. Clark, Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law, 22 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 170, 170 (1969) (“noting that the 1967 translation of Kelsen’s 
PURE THEORY OF LAW had “largely escaped the notice of jurisprudential 
commentators and citing only two other “substantial” reviews). 
19
 Stanley L. Paulson, Die Rezeption Kelsens in Amerika, in REINE 
RECHTSLEHRE IM SPIEGEL IHRER FORTSETZER UND KRITIKER (Ota 
Winberger & Werner Krawietz (eds.)) (Vienna: Springer, 1988), at 179, 
180. 
20
 Edwin Patterson, Hans Kelsen and His Pure Theory of Law, 40 CAL. 
L. REV. 5, 5 (1952).  
21
 LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-60 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1986), at 229; Michael Seven Green, 
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 Thus, to the extent that Kelsen’s approach to law appeared to be at 
odds with Legal Realism, it is not surprising that it was not 
welcomed by Kelsen’s colleagues within the U.S. legal academy. 
Before Realism arrived on the scene, U.S. legal scholarship 
was dominated by a formalist concept of law, which stressed “the 
purported autonomy and closure of the legal world and the 
predominance of formal logic within this autonomous universe.”22  
Realism defined itself in opposition to this idea of law,23 and 
Kelsen’s approach must have appeared to the Realists to be a 
version of the formalism that they had just energetically rejected 
and were in the process of eliminating from legal pedagogy and 
legal doctrine.  The twin hallmarks of Realism are two forms of 
rule-skepticism:  the view that legal rules are a myth because law 
consists only of the decisions of courts, and the view that statutes 
and other legislative creations are too indeterminate to constrain 
judges or govern their decisions.24  It is easy to understand that 
Kelsen’s views would wilt in such unforgiving soil.  
To this day, most legal scholars in the United States find his 
work either impenetrable or not worth the bother because his 
premises contradict the fundamental tenets of the U.S. approach to 
law.25  While his new works were frequently reviewed in the 
decade after he arrived in the United States, the translation of his 
major theoretical work, the Pure Theory of Law, was largely 
                                                                                                       
Legal Realism as a Theory of Law, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1915, 1917 
(2005). 
22
 Hanoch Dagan, The Realist Conception of Law, 57 TORONTO L.J. 
608, 611 (2007). 
23
 See id. at 612 (“The realist project begins with a critique of this 
formalist conception of law.”). 
24
 Green, Legal Realism, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. at 1917-18. 
25
 See Paulson, Die Rezeption Kelsens, at 180 (noting that the 
American pragmatic philosophy entailed an aversion to highfalutin 
philosophizing such as Kelsen’s neo-Kantianism).   
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ignored and his legal theory on the whole was greeted with 
indifference outside of the small academic émigré community.26 
There is a small but significant exception to the general view 
that “we”—that is, U.S. lawyers—are all Realists now.  There 
seems to be a consensus among U.S. philosophers of law that 
Realism was “mercifully put to rest by H.L.A. Hart’s decisive 
critique of ‘rule-skepticism’ in the seventh chapter of The Concept 
of Law.” 27  However, jurisprudence courses taught at U.S. law 
schools often include several sessions on Realism, and it is hard to 
imagine a student emerging from a U.S. law school without at least 
some immersion in Realist theory.  Kelsen’s name, by contrast, 
rarely graces a syllabus at a U.S. law school.28  Moreover, although 
Hart’s views are just as diametrically opposed to Realism as are 
Kelsen’s, Hart and Ronald Dworkin are probably the two 
philosophers of law with whom U.S. law students are most likely 
to be familiar.  And so, while Kelsen’s opposition to Realism 
provides some clues as to his lack of influence in the United States, 
there must be more to it than that. 
B. The Rejection of Legal Positivism as Politically Anemic 
A second reason for Kelsen’s failure to reach a U.S. audience 
has to do with the substantive politics of the U.S. academy in the 
post-war era.  Kelsen’s theory failed political litmus tests because, 
                                                 
26
 Id. at 181.  See also Fuller, The Places and Uses of Jurisprudence, 1 
J. LEGAL EDUC. at 496 (“Despite Kelsen's world-wide fame, his views 
are scarcely known among lawyers and law teachers in this country.”). 
27
 Green, Legal Realism, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. at 1917.  See also 
Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism:  Toward a Naturalized 
Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. L. REV. 267, 270 (1997) (noting that Realism 
“has had almost no impact upon the mainstream of Anglo-American 
jurisprudence”). 
28
 The exception may prove the rule.  When I was a law student, a short 
excerpt from Kelsen was assigned in only one of the three courses I took 
that focused exclusively on legal philosophy and legal reasoning.  At the 
class meeting before we were to read Kelsen, our professor told us not to 
bother as, he assured us, it would be incomprehensible to us.  We neither 
read nor discussed Kelsen in the course. 
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 although Kelsen personally supported parliamentary democracy, 
his desire to produce a pure theory of law required him to avoid 
connecting the system of law to any substantive political theory.29  
As early as 1946, Gustav Radbruch declared that positivism had 
rendered the German legal profession defenseless against laws 
with arbitrary or even criminal content.30  Lon Fuller, one of the 
most influential philosophers of law in the United States during 
Kelsen’s lifetime, concluded that legal positivism had helped pave 
the way for the Nazi seizure of power.31  At a time when fascism 
                                                 
29
 See KELSEN, INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF LEGAL THEORY, 
at  3 (“One of the objections most frequently raised against the Pure 
Theory is that by remaining entirely free of all politics, it stands apart 
from the ebb and flow of life and is therefore worthless in terms of 
science.  No less frequently, however, it is said that the Pure Theory of 
Law is not in a position to fulfill its own basic methodological 
requirement, and is itself merely the expression of a certain political 
value.  But which political value?”). 
30
 Gustav Radbruch, Gesetzliches Unrecht und übergesetzliches Recht, 
1 SÜDDEUTSCHE JURISTEN-ZEITUNG 105, 107 (1946). 
31
 Fuller held an endowed chair as Professor of General Jurisprudence 
at Havard Law School.  In a 1954 essay, Fuller wrote that the Nazis 
“would never have achieved their control over the German people had 
there not been waiting to be bent to their sinister ends attitudes towards 
law and government than had been centuries in the building.”  These 
attitudes included being “notoriously deferential to authority” and having 
“faith in certain fundamental processes of government.”  Lon L. Fuller, 
American Legal Philosophy at Mid-Century, 6 J. LEG. EDUC. 457, 466 
(1954).  In a 1958 exchange with H.L.A. Hart, Fuller declared 
positivistic philosophy incompatible with the ideal of fidelity to law.  
Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law – A Reply to Professor 
Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 646 (1958).  In the same article, Fuller 
more closely links German legal positivism to the rise of fascism in 
Germany.  See id. at 659 (contending that positivist attitudes in the 
German legal profession were “helpful to the Nazis”).  Although Fuller 
seems to think his view is the same as Radbruch’s, Stanley Paulson 
argues that they are distinguishable.  While Radbruch focused on legal 
positivism under Nazism – what Paulson calls “the exoneration thesis,” – 
Fuller was interested in legal positivism during the Weimar Republic, 
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and totalitarianism posed genuine threats to the ascendancy of 
democracy as the global model for governance, Kelsen’s theory 
did not seem to U.S. academics to provide a sufficiently robust 
defense of democracy or for sufficient safeguards against abuses of 
the law by fascist or totalitarian governments.  Writing in the mid 
1950s, Richard Carpenter typified the attitude towards German 
legal positivism in the U.S. academy when he criticized Germany’s 
advanced culture of science and intellect for its failure to resist the 
Nazi program. 32 
Far from being a proper cause for surprise, this 
phenomenon would seem a logical and predictable 
consequence of the subjective positivism with which the 
German professors were largely indoctrinated.  It would 
have seemed utterly inconsistent with their avowed 
philosophy for a well placed positivist to risk life or 
livelihood by any overt resistance to Nazi theories.  If any 
did so, he must have appeared to his more consistent 
brethren as an emotional fool or perhaps as a psychopathic 
masochist with a martyr complex.33 
At the very least, the ad hominem aspect of this criticism is 
poorly informed.34  Moreover, in his thorough study of Weimar 
                                                                                                       
what Paulson calls “the causal thesis.”  Paulson, Lon L. Fuller, Gustav 
Rabruch and the “Positivist” Theses, 13 LAW & PHIL. 313, 314 (1994).   
32
 See Richard V. Carpenter, The Problem of Value Judgments as 
Norms of Law, 7 J. LEGAL EDUC. 163, 167 (1954). 
33
 Id.   
34
 Stanley Paulson notes that “the leading spokesmen for Weimar legal 
positivism stood very far removed from the Nazi party” and “were 
known as opponents of the new Nazi regime.”  Paulson, “Positivist” 
Theses, 13 LAW & PHIL., at 347.  Specifically, Paulson has in mind: 
Gerhard Anschütz, who retired rather than teach in a Nazi university; 
Richard Thoma, who continued to teach but did not do the bidding of the 
Nazi regime; Walter Jellinek, Hans Kelsen and Hans Nawiasky, all of 
whom the Nazis purged from their university posts; and Gustav 
Radbruch, who endured “internal exile” during the Third Reich.  Id. at 
345-46. 
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 constitutionalism and legal positivism, Peter Caldwell establishes 
that most Weimar legal theorists were only lukewarm republicans, 
but he avoids any argument that a more robustly republican 
constitutional theory could have prevented the collapse of the 
Weimar Republic.35  He does so not because legal positivism 
offered stout opposition to Nazism but because there is no 
evidence that any form of legal theory has ever stood up any better 
to anti-democratic threats. 
In any case, U.S. critics of Kelsen who focus exclusively on the 
alleged political shortcomings of his approach to law ignore a vast 
corpus of legal thought that touches on a vast array of topics.  
Kelsen published over 400 works during his lifetime, covering not 
only topics in the field of jurisprudence but also in constitutional 
law, international law, the history of law and philosophy, 
contemporary politics and political theory.36 Although some 
collections of scholarly essays on Kelsen’s work have appeared in 
English,37 there has yet to be a serious scholarly monograph on 
Kelsen’s legal theory published in the United States.   
On the whole, the U.S. legal academy produced few significant 
responses to Kelsen’s legal philosophy.   However, the problem is 
not simply one of accommodating Kelsen’s approach to common 
law theory or to an Anglo-American tradition of jurisprudence.  
The U.S. legal academy is not a political or a methodological 
monolith.   Kelsen’s politics were not outside of the mainstream, 
and his neo-Kantian approach to legal theory, while perhaps not as 
                                                 
35
 PETER C. CALDWELL, POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY AND THE CRISIS OF 
GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF 
WEIMAR CONSTITUTIONALISM (1997).   
36
 Calsamiglia, 13 RATIO JURIS, at 197.  Métall provides a listing of 
over 600 works that Kelsen published up to 1966, but the list includes 
translations and book reviews.  See Métall, at 124-155.   
37
 See, e.g., ESSAYS ON KELSEN (Richard Tur & William Twining 
(ed.)) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986); LAW, STATE, AND 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER : ESSAYS IN HONOR OF HANS KELSEN 
(Salo Engel (ed.)) (Knoxville, Tenn.:  University of Tennessee Press, 
1964). 
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accessible as that of American or English legal philosophers who 
worked in the more familiar tradition of twentieth-century Anglo-
American philosophy, is not so obscure as to be incomprehensible 
to the serious student of jurisprudence.  Leading philosophers of 
law in England wrote at length on Kelsen.38  And so, while 
philosophical and political opposition to Kelsen is certainly 
significant, we must also look to other factors in order to more 
fully comprehend why Kelsen and his work have been largely 
ignored within the U.S. legal academy. 
II.  KELSEN AND THE U.S. LEGAL PROFESSION 
Part I of this Essay summarized familiar arguments that explain 
Kelsen’s lack of influence on the U.S. legal academy and the U.S. 
legal profession more generally.  In this Part, the Essay explores 
additional explanations for Kelsen’s lack of influence, sounding in 
the sociology of both the legal profession and the legal academy in 
the United States.  The aim here is not to discount the significance 
of the political and theoretical obstacles to the reception of 
Kelsen’s theory in the United States.  Rather, this Part aims to 
supplement our understanding of the myriad reasons for Kelsen’s 
failure to have an impact on the intellectual life of his adopted 
home.  In so doing, this Part offers a case study in the sociology of 
knowledge and the ways in which, as a necessary part of the 
process of the formation of a professional ethos or ideology, 
certain modes of thinking and interacting must be rejected as 
outside the realm of acceptable professional approaches to the 
relevant subject matter. 
                                                 
38
 See, e.g., H. L. A. Hart, Kelsen Visited and Kelsen’s Doctrine of the 
Unity of Law, reprinted in H. L. A. HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 
AND PHILOSOPHY (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), at 286-342; JOSEPH 
RAZ, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
THEORY OF LEGAL SYSTEM (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980) (discussing 
Kelsen’s legal system at 93-120). 
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 A. Legal Education: From Trade School to Professional Training 
1. The Transformation of Legal Education in the Early 20th 
Century United States 
Legal education in the United States took a different path from 
that followed in Europe.  While law was one of the four 
foundational faculties of the medieval European university,39 it 
was never integrated into traditional undergraduate education in 
the United States.40  Rather, legal education developed along the 
lines of trade education.41  Before the Civil War, only 9 of 39 U.S. 
jurisdictions required some sort of legal education as a necessary 
qualification for admission to the bar, and the bar examination was 
oral and casual.42   
                                                 
39
 The University of Bologna granted degrees in the arts, medicine and 
theology, but it was “pre-eminently a school of civil law.”  CHARLES 
HOMER HASKINS, THE RISE OF UNIVERSITIES (3d ed.) (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press 1957), at 11-12.  By 1231, the University of 
Paris was divided in the four faculties of arts, law medicine and theology.  
Id. at 16.  See also Juergen R. Ostertag, Legal Education in Germany and 
the United States – A Structural Comparison, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L 
L. 301, 306-07 (1993) (“The continental medieval university considered 
law to be one of the classic faculties . . . .”).  This division of continental 
European universities into faculties was still in effect during Kelsen’s 
lifetime.  Stefan Riesenfeld, A Comparison of Continental and American 
Legal Education, 36 MICH. L. REV. 31, 33 (1937).   
40
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This changed markedly in the two decades after the Civil War, 
as some sort of legal study or apprenticeship became mandatory in 
the majority of jurisdictions and a written bar examination became 
mandatory in all jurisdictions.43  Still, although Harvard’s law 
school offered a three-year post-graduate degree by 1899, twenty 
years later, only a handful of universities required an 
undergraduate degree as a pre-requisite to the study of law.44  At 
the beginning of the 20th century, law schools were still accepting 
students who could not gain admission into undergraduate 
programs at the same universities, and there were even concerns 
that universities were using their law schools to admit athletes 
otherwise underqualified for admission.45  As law schools began 
requiring at least some college education as a pre-requisite to 
admission in the first decades of the 20th century, enrollments 
dropped by more than 50 percent.46 But the victory of the Harvard 
model was eventually completed.  During the 1920s, the American 
Bar Association (ABA) adopted a policy limiting access to the bar 
exam to students who had at least two years of college before 
entering law school.  The American Association of Law Schools 
(AALS) fell in line, as its members made the completion of two 
years of college a pre-requisite to law school admission.47  By mid-
century, legal education in the United States invariably involved 
full-time, three-year day programs enrolling almost exclusively 
college-graduates, all of whom studied a nearly-identical 
curriculum of private law subjects.48 
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 2. Kelsen’s Method and the Case Law Method 
At the same time as Harvard Law School was spearheading the 
standardization of legal training, it was also effecting a revolution 
in legal pedagogy.  This was the so-called case method of teaching 
developed by Harvard’s Christopher Columbus Langdell.  
Langdell’s pedagogy was an inductive method based on the natural 
sciences.49  Students were expected to experience the development 
of legal rules through an intensive study of case law rather than by 
learning legal principles from the study of a treatise.50  Full-time 
law instructors who increasingly came to view themselves as 
scholars replaced part-time teachers who primarily viewed 
themselves as practitioners.  Harvard’s approach did not 
immediately win over the academy and the legal profession.  On 
the contrary, the case method was challenged both within Harvard 
and in the wider legal community.  The Boston University Law 
School was founded in response to Boston practitioners’ dismay at 
the “technical and historical” orientation of Harvard’s approach to 
legal education.51 Tensions over this teaching method separated the 
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main organization representing U.S. lawyers, the ABA, and the 35 
law schools organized in 1900 into the AALS.52   
After the First World War, legal education quickly regularized 
on the pattern established at the Harvard Law School.  In schools 
as disparate as the University of Montana and the University of 
Alabama, deans looked to hire full-time faculty trained in the 
Harvard teaching method.53  As other law schools increasingly 
imitated the Harvard model, legal education was transformed.  
Within fifty years, Langdell’s “method and curriculum had taken 
over legal education” in the United States.54  As William LaPiana 
put it, “A system of apprenticeship gave way to academic training 
dominated by a new division of the profession—full-time teachers 
of law.”55   
Legal education in the United States on the Harvard model 
attempted a synthesis of the law office internships that had been 
the foundation for such education in the nineteenth century and a 
rather naïve scientism, which the academy quickly outgrew with 
the advent of Legal Realism.  The case method was diametrically 
opposed to the treatise-based education that preceded it and to the 
methodology that continental law professors continued to employ 
when Kelsen was teaching.56  Writing in 1938, Max Rheinstein 
described “the main teaching method” in continental law schools 
as “the systematic lecture course, where a large field of the law 
would be treated as a coherent, logically structured whole with 
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 elaborate, clearcut concepts.”57  According to Rheinstein, 
continental students did not habitually come to class especially 
well prepared, as there were “no assignments to be worked and no 
cases to be digested.”58  Where the case method was inductive, the 
approach to legal education with which Kelsen was familiar was 
deductive, based on code rules and treatises.59  Where the case 
method focused on teaching real-life situations drawn from actual 
cases, civil law education in Kelsen’s time was based on analysis 
of concepts, which were compared or contrasted with other 
abstract concepts, all of which were reconciled within a legal 
code.60  Indeed, the case method was more generally ill-suited to 
Kelsen’s favored topics:  so-called “cultural courses,” such as 
jurisprudence, comparative law or legal history.  The Harvard 
method regarded courses such as jurisprudence, philosophy of law, 
comparative law, theory of legislation, and criminology as posing a 
risk of dilution to the “general professional curriculum.”61 
Thus by the time Kelsen arrived on the scene in the United 
States, he was doubly dated.  His deductive pedagogical approach 
could not have been more alien to U.S. law students.  Indeed, even 
compared with Anglo-American legal philosophers, Kelsen’s 
approach eschews concrete examples drawn from real or 
hypothetical cases or scenarios.  In addition, Kelsen’s system 
proclaimed itself a science of law.  His legal positivism could only 
have struck his Legal Realist colleagues as a return to the naïve 
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formalism of the previous generations.  Even though Kelsen’s 
notion of science had far more in common with the human 
sciences (Geisteswissenschaften) such as philosophy or history 
than with the natural sciences (Naturwissenschaften) on which 
Langdell based his approach to law, the distinction was likely lost 
on Kelsen colleagues and students within the U.S. legal academy.   
B. The Professionalization of Law and the Legal Academy 
Kelsen entered into a legal culture in the United States that had 
just completed a dual professionalization process.  First, the legal 
profession was put on a new footing, as legal education had been 
standardized and barriers to entry had been raised so as to greatly 
enhance the status of attorneys.  In addition, a new profession 
emerged as disciples of the Harvard pedagogical model assumed 
full-time teaching positions at law schools throughout the country.  
Because their professional status and prestige was dependent on 
their dominance of a market in educational services, the new legal 
professoriate jealously guarded its position against variant 
approaches to the law and to legal education. 
1. The Development of the Legal Profession 
Following Magali Sarfatti Larson, we can conceive of the legal 
profession as a group of trained experts attempting to establish a 
monopoly over a market in services.  According to Larson, the 
medical profession was best able to establish such a monopoly 
because the demand for medical services is always high and 
because the skills of medical professionals cannot be subjected to 
peer review as easily as can the work of, for example, lawyers, 
architects or engineers. 62  Moreover, the demand for the type of 
services offered by other professions is not as stable as is the 
demand for medical care.  The key to control over a market for 
professionals other than medical professionals thus becomes 
control over the production of producers.  By limiting the supply of 
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 credentialed practitioners, professionals such as lawyers and 
engineers assure themselves a favorable bargaining position in the 
market for their knowledge and services.63   
Generally, expertise, credentialing and autonomy set 
professions apart from other occupations.  Professional expertise 
and credentialing differ from the training and licensing of 
craftsmen, technicians, or managers in that they are generally won 
through schooling rather than through on-the-job experience.  In 
addition, professional education usually includes a measure of 
theory and the initiation into a professional jargon.64   
The Langdellian legal academy brilliantly illustrates these 
principles.  When Langdell arrived on the scene, attorneys were 
not the respected professionals that they are today.  Moreover, 
because there were few barriers to entry, practitioners suffered 
prodigiously during economic slowdowns.  By mid-century, 
however, the Langdellian revolution was completed.  One knew, 
when one hired a U.S.-educated attorney that he (and it was almost 
certainly a he) had completed an undergraduate education as well 
as a three-year course of law school and that he had also passed a 
rigorous, written examination administered by the state bar 
association, access to which was, for the most part, restricted to 
those who had completed a course of study in an accredited law 
school.  Those law schools provided a sort of professional training 
and credentialing that was specifically designed to elevate the 
status of the legal profession above that of ordinary laborers or 
craftsmen.   
As Larson points out, professions do not so much meet existing 
needs as shape or channel the needs of consumers by changing the 
criteria for an acceptable quality of life.65  In order for a profession 
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to succeed, it needs to convince society as a whole that its services 
are necessary and that only people with a certain kind of expertise 
and credentialing are qualified to provide such services.  Larson 
divides the characteristics of professions according to their 
cognitive, normative, and evaluative dimensions: 
The cognitive dimension is centered on the body of 
knowledge and techniques which the professionals apply in 
their work, and on the training necessary to master such 
knowledge and skills; the normative dimension covers the 
service orientation of professionals, and their distinctive 
ethics, which justify the privilege of self-regulation granted 
them by society; the evaluative dimension implicitly 
compares professions to other occupations, underscoring 
the professions' singular characteristics of autonomy and 
prestige.66   
The cognitive attributes of the professions are perhaps most 
obvious to the uncritical observer.  Professionals undergo highly 
specialized and advanced education, and this education legitimizes 
the normative and evaluative advantages professionals enjoy.  It 
was thus crucial to the legitimacy of the legal profession in the 
United States that legal education become graduate education and 
that the qualifications of lawyers be standardized.   
But professionals themselves see their positions as a “calling” 
and as a responsibility.  They abide by special codes of 
professional conduct, and they are committed to a certain degree of 
altruism or public service.  The rise of the Harvard model thus 
coincided with the ABA’s promulgation of a code of professional 
ethics, which was quickly adopted at the state level.67  Once 
adopted, this code of ethics remained in place, unchallenged for 
over half a century.68  The twentieth-century legal profession 
quickly developed into a stable structure.  Lawyers shared a 
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 common professional ethos that remained unchanged for 
generations.  That ethos was tied both to the status of lawyers as 
professionals engaged in an altruistic calling, a public service, and 
to the high status of lawyers as members of an exclusive 
association of trained experts. 
Finally, professionals are evaluated through rigorous 
competency tests and examinations, which result in their eventual 
licensing.  In order for the legal profession to enjoy enhanced 
status, it was thus necessary for bar examinations to become more 
regularized across the country.  Indeed, bar exams became more 
rigorous during the Great Depression of the 1930s, as state bar 
associations came to view the exam as a means to restrict entry 
into the profession while also shielding the public from 
incompetent attorneys.69  Those who acquired the cognitive, 
normative and evaluative attributes that came to be associated with 
the legal profession reaped significant rewards in terms of high 
social prestige, relatively high economic rewards, and autonomy.  
2. The Creation of the Profession of Legal Scholars 
While the specifics of the professionalization of legal scholars 
are unique, that process is also part of a trend whereby academic 
disciplines were professionalized in the United States beginning in 
the nineteenth century.70  Like all professions, the legal 
professoriate needed to create an identifiable product, exclude 
competitors from the market for their product and create a 
professional ideology and ethos to justify their domination of that 
market.71  In law, the professionalization process was twofold, as 
creation of a new academic discipline of legal scholarship 
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accompanied the strengthening of the professional ethos among 
practicing attorneys.  Langdellian teacher/scholars sought to 
remove teachers/practitioners from their midst while also 
convincing non-teaching practitioners that their pedagogical 
methods would result in better-trained lawyers, indeed in an 
entirely better breed of attorneys.  Like other professionalizing 
professoriates, legal scholars sought to delineate their turf by 
associating it with a certain type of individual—the legal scholar—
and to eliminate their amateur predecessors from that turf.72  
Through the case method, Langdell and the Harvard Law 
School not only solidified the professional status of lawyers, it also 
created a new profession—that of full-time law teachers.73  In 
order to do so, it had to overcome significant opposition from 
adherents of older, less successful professional models.74  When 
Kelsen arrived in the United States, the profession of legal 
academics had just emerged victorious in a bruising struggle 
against all comers—including formalists and devotees of deductive 
teaching methods as well as practitioners who wanted legal 
education to continue to take the form of a vocational 
apprenticeship.  The legal academy was effectively closed to 
methodological, pedagogical and theoretical perspectives that 
might have threatened the ascendancy of the newly created legal 
professoriate.  Indeed, because certain modes of discourse, 
associated with the case method, Socratic teaching approaches, and 
Realism had become associated with the ethos of legal academia, 
the alternative approaches to legal theory and to legal education 
that Kelsen represented threatened to undermine the status and 
authority of the new legal professoriate. 
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 In their analyses of professional behavior, sociologists now 
increasingly focus on expertise, prestige, and the creation of 
monopolies over markets or expertise.75  The core of 
professionalization is the monopolization of the processes that lead 
to the production of professionals in a given field or practice.  
Universities come to monopolize not only the processes through 
which professionals receive credentials essential to their 
employment but also the production of knowledge in a given field.  
Modern professions are structures that link “the production of 
knowledge to its application in a market of services” and 
universities become “the training institutions . . . in which this 
linkage is effected.”76  Such a monopoly over a market in services, 
and over the educational structures supporting such a market, 
increases the distance between professionals and the lay people 
they serve, thus enhancing the status and authority of 
professionals.   
In introducing the case method as the core of legal education, 
Langdell assumed the role as initiator of a discursive practice.  As 
Michel Foucault has described them, discursive practices “are not 
purely and simply ways of producing discourse.”  Rather they 
“become embodied in technical processes, in institutions, in 
patterns for general behavior, in forms for transmission and 
diffusion, and in pedagogical forms.”77  There has been 
extraordinary stability in legal education since Langdell’s time.  
Not only has there been remarkably little change in the pedagogy 
and curriculum of U.S. law schools, some of the cases included in 
casebooks and taught in private law courses in Langdell’s era are 
still staples of legal education today.78  Langdell’s discursive 
                                                 
75
 LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM, at 17. 
76
 Id. at 50-51. 
77
 Michel Foucault, History of Systems of Thought, in LANGUAGE, 
COUNTER-MEMORY, PRACTICE: SELECTED ESSAYS AND INTERVIEWS BY 
MICHEL FOUCAULT (Donald F. Bouchard (ed.)) (Ithaca, NY:  Cornell 
University Press, 1977), at 199, 200. 
78
 For example, in “Dear Sister Antillico . . .” The Story of Kirksey v. 
Kirksey, 94 GEORGETOWN L.J. 321, 373 (2006), William R. Casto and 
24 [MARCH 2008] 
 
practice in the realm of legal pedagogy has survived despite its 
association with an outmoded legal formalism.79  The U.S. legal 
profession was transformed in myriad ways as a result of the 
Langdellian innovations begun at Harvard.  That transformation 
could not stop to pause and consider Kelsenian perspectives. 
CONCLUSION 
The limited literature on the Kelsen reception in the United 
States largely explains his small impact on the U.S. legal academy 
in terms of the political and philosophical rejection of his legal 
theory.  But that explanation is inadequate.  Kelsen’s politics were 
not out of the mainstream.  He, like many leading German legal 
positivists, demonstrated his personal refusal to accommodate his 
approach to that of the Nazis, and he suffered for his principled 
opposition to the Nazi version of law.  Only a tiny minority of U.S. 
legal professors could articulate criticisms of Kelsen’s legal 
philosophy that would not also be criticisms of H.L.A. Hart’s legal 
philosophy.  Yet, Hart’s jurisprudence is usually at the center of 
such discussions of legal theory as take place in U.S. law schools.  
Political and philosophical opposition to Kelsen’s perspectives 
certainly existed, but that opposition provides only a partial 
explanation of U.S. legal community’s persistent ignorance of 
Kelsen’s thought. 
It is thus useful to supplement discussions of political and 
philosophical opposition to Kelsen with a sociological perspective.  
Kelsen had little impact in the U.S. legal academy not only 
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 because his brand of legal positivism was uncongenial to a U.S. 
audience.  He also had little impact because he arrived in the 
United States just as the twin innovations of Legal Realism and the 
professionalization of legal academy were solidifying their 
monopolistic grips on the U.S. legal community.  His mode of 
legal thought and his approach to legal education could not be 
accommodated within the newly-created discursive practice of the 
legal professoriate, and there was thus little possibility that he 
could be discussed or taken seriously in that realm. 
